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Company and contract
labour in a central Indian
steel plant
Jonathan Parry
Abstract
This paper offers a descriptive analysis of the way in which the working world of
contract labourers in a public-sector Indian steel plant is differentiated from that of
its regular workforce. The two kinds of workers regard themselves as distinct kinds
of people and are now best seen as distinct social classes. While the sociology of India
has broadly accepted the manual/non-manual labour distinction as the crucial
marker of the boundary between the working and the middle classes, what is
suggested here is that that between naukri (secure employment) and kam (insecure
wage labour) – which cuts right across that distinction and is broadly congruent with
that between formal- and informal-sector employment – is a more important marker
of difference. At work, the two kinds of workforce are sharply distinguished by the
material rewards of their jobs and by their security and conditions of employment;
outside it by differences in life-style and attitudes – a gap that has grown with the
liberalization of the Indian economy. The composition of the work groups to which
the two kinds of labour characteristically belong are sharply differentiated by gender,
by regional ethnicity and by urban or rural residence. Interactions within the work
group are again very different, while interactions between regular and contract
workers are largely confined to the work itself. Outside it they are kept to a
minimum, testifying to a shared sense that socially the two kinds of workforce are
profoundly different.
Keywords: class; labour; work; steel industry; formal and informal sector.
Framing
Located in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh, the Bhilai Steel Plant
(BSP) is one of several large-scale public-sector plants managed by the Steel
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Authority of India Limited (SAIL). I have written about its regular company
workforce elsewhere (e.g. Parry, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2009) and reference some
of these writings in what follows as a backdrop to the situation of the contract
labour that works alongside it. My focus here is on how their working lives are
differentiated from those of permanent employees; and I largely confine my
account to the plant itself, making only passing mention of its mines and of the
private-sector factories that surround it. The situation in these differs
somewhat.
Though, for contemporary Western countries, the enduring significance of
the distinction between manual and non-manual labour as what crucially
divides the ‘working’ from the ‘middle’ class(es) may require some qualifica-
tion (e.g. Braverman, 1974; Parkin, 1979, ch. 2), the sociology of India has – for
good reason – largely continued to regard it as the crucial marker of class
boundaries (e.g. Bardhan, 1989; Be´teille, 2001; Rudra, 1989; Sridharan, 2011).
In the world of caste, work that dirties the hands is held in notoriously low
esteem. That notwithstanding, I argue that the distinction between naukri and
kam – which cuts across the manual/non-manual divide – is of even greater
material and ideological significance. Manual as well as non-manual BSP
employees have naukri, contract workers do kam, and that makes a world of
difference to the lives that they lead. The two kinds of worker cannot usefully
be regarded as belonging to the same social class and do not see themselves as
the same kind of people (Parry, forthcoming).
Naukri (‘service’) is a permanent and regular job that carries a monthly
salary and is protected by legal guarantees against arbitrary termination. Pakki
naukri – the ‘complete’ or ‘perfect’ version of it – is sarkari naukri (government
employment). Even relatively secure and well-paid employment in the private
sector is by comparison kachchi (‘incomplete’ or ‘imperfect’). Naukri confers
ijjat (‘honour’) and is a major asset when it comes to arranging a marriage,
raising a loan or resisting the unreasonable demands of one’s boss. It’s a
‘proper job’. By contrast with it, kam (otherwise ‘work’ in general) signifies
untenured casual employment that is prototypically waged work that is paid by
the day and is never secure. It is of so little account that my informants often
describe those who do it as berozgar (‘unemployed’), even if they regularly
work double shifts in the miasma of fumes and coal-dust, and in ambient air
temperatures of 50 degrees Celsius, on the tops of the BSP Coke Oven
batteries.
BSP workers and managers alike are the beneficiaries of sarkari naukri, and I
claim that in terms of consumption, life-styles and aspirations an ever-growing
proportion of the former now share a good deal more in common with junior
managers than they do with the contract labour force, while in terms of ‘the
size of the purse’ they are indisputably ‘middle class’, which is how they
generally consider themselves and are considered by others (Parry, forth-
coming). That is to say, the distinction between naukri and kam is a sharper
and more socially salient marker of class boundaries than the distinction
between manual and non-manual labour.
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The proposition that regular plant workers are significantly ‘embourgeoi-
sified’ admittedly raises some difficult issues. We must obviously be able to
distinguish the class situation of ordinary workers from that of senior
managers, and this would require consideration of the importance of
credentials and of organizational authority structures. In what follows,
however, I leave this task to one side to pursue only the more limited claim
that BSP company and contract labour should be seen as belonging to different
(and sometimes opposed) social classes. What I aim to document here is the
way they are set apart by their conditions of work. Elsewhere I have argued
that they are also distinguished by the kind of world they inhabit outside work.
Their children characteristically have different kinds of upbringing and very
unequal life chances (Parry, 2005); the value they attach to the conjugal bond
and to the stability of marriage is distinctively different (Parry, 2001); and they
have markedly different propensities to suicide (Parry, 2012) and different
ideas about the costs and benefits of industrial modernity (Parry, 2008).
The naukri/kam opposition is, of course, a folk variant on the legal
distinction between ‘organized’- and ‘unorganized’-sector employment; and –
provided we do not restrict informal labour to the self-employed but also
include daily wage workers (Breman, 2003, p. 199) – it is also broadly
congruent with the ‘formal’/’informal’ divide. In India organized-sector
workers (never more than about 8 per cent of the total workforce) are the
(at least theoretical) beneficiaries of labour laws governing enforceable
minimum wages, hours and conditions of work, job security, safety, union
recognition and the like. Unorganized-sector labour is (at least in practice)
unprotected.
Job security is critical. If vulnerability to unemployment has ‘traditionally’
been the hallmark of the proletarian condition (e.g. Lockwood, 1958, p. 55),
and what most critically distinguishes the working from the middle class, in
India it is those who do kam who epitomize it, while those who have sarkari
naukri live at some considerable remove from it, regardless of whether they
work with their hands. It is very difficult to get fired. They are consequently
able to treat their jobs as a kind of property right, and this affords them
considerable protection against the vagaries of the labour market (Parry,
forthcoming; cf. Breman, 1996, p. 180; Parkin, 1979, ch. 4). Not only that, but
a regular BSP job provides a secure income at a rate that permits the
accumulation of a surplus for investment, soft credit in the form of company
loans and enough leisure to run a ‘side business’. Many BSP workers make a
moonlighting income – from, for example, a shop, a taxi, truck or typing
institute, from small-scale construction contracts or a catering business, from
money-lending, property dealing or even share speculation. In short, naukri
enables a worker to build up a property ‘portfolio’ that is likely to include
agricultural and/or urban land and housing, and the assets of a moonlighting
enterprise, as well as the rights he has in his job. The wages of contract labour
seldom allow anything more than the precarious reproduction of minimal
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existence. Over recent years the proportion of the latter in the BSP labour
force has grown significantly.
In general, the main motivation for, and most conspicuous result of, the
informalization of labour is to cheapen its price, and it might be supposed that
the availability of cheap contract labour would exert a downward pressure on
the wages of formal-sector workers and that self-employment in self-
exploitative petty commodity production would exacerbate that trend by
reducing the reproduction costs of such workers. Given that contract labour
has allowed BSP to radically reduce its permanent workforce, informalization
must certainly have cut its total wage bill, but there is little sign that it has had
much impact on the unit cost of regular labour. In terms of the consumption
classes identified by National Council for Applied Economic Research surveys,
even the households of the lowest-paid BSP workers fall comfortably into the
most affluent quarter of all households in the country (Parry, forthcoming).
The large majority of contract labourer households would fall well within the
poorest fifth. It therefore seems more plausible to suggest to the contrary that
contract labour sustains the high price (as well as the relatively relaxed rhythms
of work) of the regular labour force. It is otherwise difficult to see how in the
present economic climate they could live so well or how the plant could run at
a profit (as it consistently has since the mid-1970s). The obvious explanation is
that their comparative comfort is subsidized by others who do the most
arduous and unpleasant tasks at a fraction of the cost.
It is now conventional to stress that the labour market is multiple rather than
dual, and that there are often well-guarded barriers to entry into even the most
unenviable informal-sector occupations. According to Holmstro¨m, ‘people at
the very bottom live in little closed boxes, competing fiercely with other very
poor people in other closed boxes’ (1984, p. 282), while Breman similarly
speaks of the ‘closed shop character’ (1996, p. 257) of informal-sector
employment that results from a pattern of recruitment through kinship links,
that restricts sideways mobility and that inhibits the development of class
consciousness. This ‘compartmentalization’ is commonly based on caste
(Harriss-White, 2003, p. 31) and is well attested by ethnography (e.g. De
Neve, 2005; van der Loop, 1996). It is not, however, what I find in Bhilai.
Though there are certainly some occupational niches that interlopers cannot
easily penetrate, many more of the labouring poor move readily and frequently
between contract work in the plant, casual labour on construction sites outside
it, loading and unloading jobs, and various forms of self-employment as
rickshaw-valas, vegetable sellers, street vendors, waste-pickers and the like.
That is to say, occupational boundaries in the informal sector are a great deal
more porous than the boundary between naukri and kam. Long gone are the
days when it was relatively easy to start out as a construction worker digging
the foundations for the plate mill and wind up as a regular BSP operative
maintaining its rollers. Gone too are the days when it was a realistic aspiration
for that daily-wage worker’s son to get a regular job in the plant. The situation
of Bhilai contract labourers is quite different from that of the cheap flexible
Jonathan Parry: Company and contract labour in a central Indian steel plant 351
workforce that Sanchez (2012) has recently described for the Tata truck factory
in Jamshedpur. While the latter are overwhelmingly the ‘wards’ (usually the
sons) of existing workers who serve as long-term ‘apprentices’ in the frustrated
hope that the company will eventually honour its promise of appointing them
to a permanent post, the former can have no such expectations. If – following
Weber– a ‘social class’ is the totality of positions ‘between which mobility
either within the lifetime of an individual or over successive generations is a
readily possible and typically observable occurrence’ (1978, p. 57), contract and
construction workers, daily-wage labourers, rickshaw-valas, waste-pickers and
their ilk are a discernible social class. They are what BSP workers call the
‘labour class’. To suggest that they themselves might belong in it would be
highly offensive. As both sides see it, they self-evidently do not. And if,
alternatively, we privilege the property aspect of class, the BSP worker is – as
already suggested – likely to have accumulated assets far in excess of the
marginal peasant holding of even the more fortunate among the contact labour
force.
How has this differentiation come about and how is it manifested in the
workplace? I will try to explain. Much, as we shall see, about the current
situation of contract labour must be understood in the light of the
contradiction between an apparently ‘progressive’ set of labour laws and
economic imperatives that are lent special urgency by the liberalization of the
Indian economy.
The context of contract labour
The BSP was built with Soviet collaboration in the late 1950s and early 1960s
on a green-field site in what was then a ‘backward’ rural region. Begun within a
decade of Independence, the project was to be a ‘temple’ to Nehru’s vision of a
secular and ‘socialist pattern of society’, a ‘beacon’ on the path to India’s
industrial modernity. It had more to do with nation-building and creating
employment than with maximizing profit. Over the past two decades these
priorities have been reversed. By the late 1980s, the company had around
65,000 employees on its direct payroll, in worker grades almost all of them
male. By January 2011 this was down to 31,500, a reduction accomplished
through voluntary retirement and natural attrition, without forced redundan-
cies or significant investment in labour-saving technology. Output has been
maintained – indeed enhanced1 – largely by the deployment of much cheaper
contract labour in the least skilled, but most physically taxing, tasks. The two
things, of course, are connected – the cheap labour and the slow pace of
technological innovation.
Abutting the 17 square kilometre plant is its company township, and nearby
an industrial estate with over 200 private-sector factories. On all sides is a sea of
urban sprawl that has swallowed a number of peasant villages. The urban
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agglomeration has a population of around one million. Some distance from it
are the BSP mines with their own mini-townships.
In the pioneer days, when the project required much more labour than the
local peasantry was able or willing to supply, workers flooded in from all
corners of the country and many put down permanent roots in the town. In
1960, when the plant had a mere 1,800 production operatives, 30,000
construction workers – drawn predominantly from the lower rungs of rural
society – were employed on site. In response to political pressure, many were
assimilated into the regular workforce when large-scale retrenchment later took
place (Parry, 2003). When, moreover, the dispossessed local peasantry came to
claim the BSP jobs that were promised as part of the compensation package for
their requisitioned land, it was those from the bottom of the caste and class
hierarchies who generally came first. During the 1960s, then, the boundary
between organized- and unorganized-sector labour was rather permeable, and,
as plant jobs became progressively more remunerative from the 1970s on, BSP
provided an avenue for significant upward mobility.
That is no longer the case. Regular plant employees are now an aristocracy
of labour cut off from the rest of manual workforce, the beneficiaries of a
degree of security, a pace of work, a level of pay and an array of perks and
benefits that make them the envy of that manual workforce. They inhabit a
‘citadel’ of state-sponsored privilege that is well protected against interlopers.
Competition for these jobs has intensified enormously. While vacancies have
dried to a trickle, the pool of applicants has recently been greatly expanded by
lifting the rule that workers can be recruited only through local employment
exchanges and there has been considerable inflation in the qualifications
required. ‘Labour class’ children go to, and mostly soon drop out of, dismal
state government schools. BSP children are educated in the better-quality
company system or now increasingly in a private ‘English-medium’ school, and
often continue beyond it with an industrial diploma or degree. In selecting
between qualified candidates, ‘brother-nephew-ism’ (bhai-bhatijavad) and
bribery (ghus dena) – said to involve sums that might exceed an informal-
sector household’s income for a whole decade – are supposedly critical. The
result is that over the past 25 years those who do not already belong within the
citadel have stood less and less chance of scaling its walls.
A plant of this size and complexity requires some flexible labour. Huge
quantities of raw materials arrive by train, the flow is inevitably uneven and
Indian Railways levy a detention charge on wagons. When they bunch, extra
hands are needed to unload them. In addition to jobs of that kind, BSP has
long employed contract labour in construction, maintenance and cleaning, and
even in 1994 – when I first spent time on the shop-floor – regular workers were
pointing to tasks that were formerly theirs but were now done by thekadar
mazdur (contract workers).
Though the real beginnings of the liberalization of the Indian economy are
conventionally dated to 1991, it was not until several years later that its effects
on the plant workforce became obvious. By then BSP was competing in a
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global market, at home its products were no longer so impregnably protected
by tariffs and this coincided with a major downturn in world demand.
Rumours about total privatization were circulating, a serious but unsuccessful
attempt was made to find a buyer for its Oxygen Plant and some township
housing was actually sold off. Previous policy had been to shed permanent
workers, especially those approaching retirement age (recently raised from 58
to 60). Management complained that it was increasingly difficult to persuade
an ageing workforce to do the more menial and laborious tasks. Somewhat
counter-intuitively, however, its strategy during the crisis of the late 1990s was
to cut contract labour as far as was possible. It was an expense on which BSP
could immediately economize, while – at least in the short term – laying off
regular workers with legally enforceable employment rights was costly and
complicated. As I will later elaborate, however, I believe that its main
motivation was the (as management saw it, disastrous) threat of being legally
obliged to provide permanent jobs for a significant proportion of its contract
workforce – as had recently happened at their sister SAIL plant at Rourkela.
The downturn was short-lived, however. The steel market regained its
buoyancy in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, the pressure was relieved
and the policy shelved. Certainly by the time I returned to the Coke Oven
shop-floor in 2006 after a gap of several years, contract labour seemed much
more ubiquitous and the range of tasks it performed now included a number
that were production-related and thus previously regarded as the preserve of
the regular workforce. In the meantime also, the oldest of BSP’s three sintering
plants2 – which are an integral part of the production process and employ a
workforce of thousands – had been subcontracted out to the Hindustan Steel
Construction Limited (HSCL) (another public sector concern) and was being
manned exclusively by contract labour.
While it is possible to have reasonable faith in plant figures for its regular
employees, I have little in those it compiles for contract labour. The issue is
politically sensitive, and I vacillate between the view that nobody actually
knows the global position and the view that the few who do will not tell. BSP’s
own statistics suggest suspiciously little variation. In 1993–4 the figure was
8,000–9,000; in 2011 it was around 9,500, and every time I inquired in the
interim it was within that range. That is hard to credit, and, when I expressed
scepticism to the senior manager in charge of the Contract Labour Cell, he
conceded that there appears to be a ‘gap’ but claimed to be incapable of
accounting for it. Even on the smaller canvas of the Coke Ovens, the issue
proved hard to investigate. In 2006, after much hesitation and flurried
consultation the senior officers running major contracts produced a consensus
figure of just over 1,000. It was only later I learned that, according to company
rules, the number of contract workers must not exceed the difference between
the number of ‘sanctioned’ posts (the manning level deemed proper at some
point long past) and ‘the manpower in position’ (the number of posts currently
filled). The Coke Ovens had 3,579 sanctioned posts and 2,550 regular workers,
and the gap between the two was just over 1,000.
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Apart from deliberate obfuscation, there are a number of reasons why the
real position is hard to gauge. One reputedly widespread scam is for the
contractor to charge BSP for the wages of more workers than he actually
employs, and to split the sum he receives for his phantom labour with the BSP
officer who signs his bills. In that case more contract workers appear on the
books than actually exist. To the opposite effect, contractors regularly under-
report the number of days on which their workers work. This is because they
are legally obliged to pay them the state government minimum wage, which
they rarely do. The worker signs a receipt for the amount actually paid, but by
reducing the number of days it took to earn it the contractor’s attendance
records ‘prove’ that he was ‘properly’ remunerated. Again, hundreds of private
trucks go in and out of the plant each day, and on a composite pass each could
until recently carry a crew of seven for loading and unloading. Without
detection, they could easily work for a plant contractor. Currently, many – one
contractor told me more than half his labour – enter on temporary gate passes
that are not logged on the plant’s computer system. It takes weeks or months,
and yards of red tape, for regular passes to be issued. Temporary ones can be
made in a day and workers who have them go unrecorded. There is therefore
no pressure to pay them the minimum wage or provide compensation in the
event of an accident.
In short, it is impossible to say with much conviction how large the contract
labour force really is. According to BSP, on 31 January 2011 the figure was
9,449, while, according to a press report3 based on briefing by the Deputy
Labour Commissioners, who had – most unusually – conducted a surprise raid
on BSP contractors a couple of days later, it was over 22,000. If that second
figure is correct, then the total plant workforce exceeds 50,000, which is close
to the number of regular employees that it had in 1993. Throughout the whole
period of liberalisation, that is, BSP has shed very little manpower. It has for
the most part merely substituted visible (and costly) BSP workers for invisible
(and inexpensive) contract labour – the fairly marginal reductions being easily
achievable because the plant was previously much overmanned, and because in
routine unskilled tasks contract workers are at least as efficient and work more
consistently over longer hours than BSP workers. But whatever the true figure,
by contrast with the regular workforce, a significant proportion (roughly one-
third) of contract labour is female.
During the financial year 1997–8, 227 contractors holding around 700
contracts did work in the plant and the township, and today there are more.
Recognized BSP contractors are classified according to their expertise and
graded according to the value of the contracts for which they can tender.
Subsequently part of the job may be put out to a subcontractor, who may in
turn subcontract. It is difficult to eliminate middlemen. Foreign participation
in major projects may be the best option, and such companies cannot be
expected to recruit and manage their own local labour.
For routine jobs, the Contract Labour Cell invites tenders from its slate of
regular contractors and – with certain provisos – is obliged to award the
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contract to the lowest bidder, regardless of his record as an employer. In
principle, the competition is purely on price, though for many annual contracts
– like cleaning jobs in the Coke Ovens – it is in practice limited. The number
of eligible bidders is small, they have all worked in the plant for years and are
well acquainted, and they operate a cartel that ensures that such contracts in
different departments are rotated on Buggins’ turn rules. BSP provides
materials and supervision, so quality is supposedly constant. The contractor is
basically a labour supplier, and the rule of thumb is that 85 per cent of the cost
of a contract goes on wages. It is on wages that contractors make their margins,
and when their labour is un-unionized they do so comfortably. For each man-
day, BSP pays the contractor at a rate well in excess of the legal minimum; the
contractor pays the worker at a rate far below it, siphoning off more than half
the sum that the worker should get.
With a lot of workers there is a lot of money to be made, and the big
contractors are seriously wealthy. The majority are more middling kinds of
people. Several ‘petty’ (sub-)contractors I know are retired BSP workers.
Rather than opulence, the common denominator is their family origins in other
states. Their workers are overwhelmingly local Chhattisgarhis. Contractors
and contract labourers are divided by regional ethnicity and seldom related by
kinship. Things are very different in private-sector factories, where the
contractors (also commonly outsiders) are characteristically trusted former
workers, who – to evade the labour laws – have been given charge of some part
of the process and have recruited their kinsmen, caste fellows and co-villagers
to run it. The shop-floor is consequently often divided into ‘blocks’ of workers
who are bound to each other, and to their contractor, through ‘primordial’ ties
(Parry, 1999a).
For the past 10 years or so, an increasing amount of BSP work (especially in
production-related tasks) has been awarded on contract to HSCL, a
government undertaking originally set up to construct public-sector steel
plants. When the Bokaro plant (in Bihar) was completed in the 1970s, around
6,000 of its workers were – to vociferous local protest – transferred to Bhilai to
work on the current expansion programme. By the early 1990s, most of those
still in post (around 3,500) had literally nothing to do and were irregularly paid
for sitting around in the plant in a demoralized haze of ganja, playing cards and
carping about the corrupt incompetence of their officers. HSCL was a very
sick company. Since that time, however, its financial health has been restored
by easing out most of its regular workforce and by taking contracts run through
sub-contractors and casual labour. BSP management was under heavy
government pressure to put work its way. According to official statistics, by
November 2006 58 per cent of the contract labour working in the plant was
supplied by HSCL. None of it is unionized and it is these workers who endure
the harshest conditions and are most vulnerable to under payment, late
payment or even no payment at all. The arrangement is greatly to BSP’s
advantage. Though it has not been tested in the courts, and its legality
is unclear, HSCL is declared as the ‘principal employer’ of these workers.
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Since they are not therefore BSP’s responsibility, it hopes to be off a dangerous
legal hook.
The law and the unions
What the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act of 1970 appears to
say is that workers who perform tasks for which there is ‘a permanent and
perennial need’, and workers who have been continuously employed for 240
days, must be given a permanent job and paid the same wages and receive the
same benefits as other regular employees. But law is open to judicial
interpretation, and over the past 15 years this is held to have become
increasingly employer-friendly. When I began research in Bhilai in 1993–4, the
‘permanent and perennial’ clause was generally understood to mean what it
seems to say – that, if there is a regular need for the work, the worker should
get a regular job. Lately, however, this understanding has been qualified by
learned arguments to the effect that it must be read in conjunction with other
legal provisions that mean that he is entitled only if it can also be shown that he
has worked 240 consecutive days and that the company has a ‘clear vacancy’ in
such a post, which has to be one ‘notified’ by the state government as a job that
only regular workers can perform.
For BSP the issue is critical. If ‘permanent and perennial need’ were literally
interpreted it would be legally obliged to offer regular posts to hundreds of
janitors, sweepers and security guards in the township and in its company
schools, to say nothing of thousands of contract workers in the plant. In the
recent past management has fought and lost a protracted battle over the status
of its canteen workers that turned on precisely this issue, as did a lengthy and
again eventually triumphant union campaign on behalf of contract labour in
the Rourkela Steel Plant. As a result of that, and to consternation in senior
SAIL circles facing steel market recession, 4,500 Rourkela contract workers
doing 246 different jobs had been ‘regularized’ at the beginning of 1995
(Str€umpell, 2012). As hinted earlier, that was almost certainly the principal
reason why BSP management were anxiously concerned to diminish their
reliance on such labour at the end of the 1990s. And it is, of course, in the light
of this ‘threat’ that BSP’s relationship with HSCL must be seen. It provides
BSP with a protective buffer against the demand that it regularize those
contract workers – like the doormen on the Coke Oven batteries – who
perform tasks that have hitherto been defined as part of the production
process. Since all production jobs are ‘notified’ as ones that can be done only
by BSP labour, these workers might appear to have an unassailable case.
Management’s first line of defence has been to re-define the oven doorman’s
job as consisting in cleaning tasks, but its failsafe plea is that these workers are
not their responsibility since HSCL is the principal employer. As we are about
to see, it was also such considerations that 30 years since prompted BSP to buy
off 3,000 derisorily paid contract labourers with the special status of ‘Central
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Provident Fund (CPF) worker’. For these workers themselves it was (in ways I
shall shortly specify) a dramatic improvement, but for BSP it was a cut-price
bargain. They were all doing jobs of a permanent and perennial nature and
should seemingly have been appointed to regular posts, but the deal that was
struck with a compliant union allowed management to ignore hundreds of
others who almost certainly had an equally good claim.
The union that long represented the regular plant workforce is affiliated to
the Indian Trades Union Congress (INTUC), which is affiliated to the
Congress Party.4 Regular workers in BSP’s mechanized mines almost all
belong to an AITUC (All-India Trade Union Congress) union that is affiliated
to the Communist Party of India (CPI). Other local unions come under the
umbrella of CITU (Centre of Indian Trades Unions), the union wing of India’s
other major parliamentary communist party, the CPM. In management eyes,
INTUC is the least of the evils and it was able to ensure that the
‘representative’ union in the plant was an INTUC one. ‘Representative’ is a
legal status that means that the employers are obliged to negotiate with that
union only. Since INTUC was seen as more ‘reasonable’ than the rest – not
once in the plant’s whole history has it called an official strike – this was a great
convenience. It allowed management largely to ignore the others, and gave
workers no alternative but to join the ‘representative’ one if they wanted to be
represented at all. To be clear, we are talking about regular workers. The
INTUC union was their union, and it was only when CITU started to
mobilize contract labour that – with encouragement from management –
INTUC showed interest in it. At present, however, there is no recognized
union. In the mid-1990s, the official one imploded in factional disarray, was
eventually suspended by the courts in 2005 and has so far proved impossible to
resurrect.
The mines have a more militant history, though since the mid-1970s the
‘recognized’ AITUC communist union has been basically management
compliant. It represented the privileged elite workforce of the mechanized
mines, who were regular BSP employees and predominantly outsiders. The
Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (‘Chhattisgarh Liberation Front’ or CMM) made
the radical running, and its roots were in the manual mines where conditions
were a great deal tougher, the pay was much lower and the exclusively contract
labour workforce – which was deeply resentful of the way in which its interests
had been ignored, indeed betrayed, by AITUC – was overwhelmingly drawn
from the surrounding countryside. The two unions represented different
constituencies with different interests, and through the late 1970s and 1980s
there was a series of bloody confrontations between them resulting in a number
of deaths.
Though in more pallid form, and now largely forgotten, the plant too has a
record of antagonism between unions representing these different fractions of
labour. In the late 1970s and early 1980s CITU took up a legal battle on behalf
of the contract labour force, up to that point ignored by INTUC, that
eventually resulted in around 3,000 of them performing routinely required
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tasks becoming ‘CPF-rated’. That meant that a CPF contribution had to be
deducted from their wage, the contractor contributing an equivalent amount.
Its import was that they now had legal rights, and their pay and conditions
were greatly improved. When it came, however, to negotiating which jobs
qualified, and thus to deciding which workers were to have this privileged
status, BSP management was of course obliged to deal with the recognized
union. It was those who joined INTUC who got it, provoking violent
skirmishes between supporters of the rival unions in the early 1980s.
Thereafter, BSP management, the contractors and – until its suspension –
the INTUC union consistently colluded to keep CITU out.
Since the 1980s, the contract labour force in the plant has been largely
quiescent; apart from the now dwindling number of CPF workers (down to
around 1,700 by 2006), none of it is even notionally unionized. None bar the
CPF workers have any kind of job security and all know that joining a union is
the surest way to get fired and never re-hired. Management sleeps soundly in
the complacent conviction that contract labour represents no threat to the
plant’s proud record of industrial peace, and it has little reason to worry that its
regular workforce will make common cause with them in the name of
proletarian unity. BSP workers do not think of themselves as ‘proletarians’ or
as the same kind of people as this ‘labour class’, do not consider that they have
interests in common with it and may even inchoately perceive that their
interests are opposed. But, even if that were not the case, without a union they
now have no effective voice, and the union they had was anyway uninterested.
As to forming a more radical one, it would take a brave heart. Though to be
in any danger of losing his job a BSP worker has to be regularly and
dedicatedly absent from duty or get caught persistently cheating on benefits or
pilfering plant property, he is unwise to arouse suspicion of being a leftist
‘agitator’. BSP is an integrated plant and damage to capital infrastructure
costing many tens of millions of rupees can be caused by unscheduled
shutdowns – which must be one powerful reason why, in the absence of scarce
skills, this workforce has been treated with so much consideration and has
managed to preserve its privileges. But management also has ways of weeding
out ‘dangerous elements’, and BSP workers are frightened to associate with
such people. Naukri comes at a political price; and contract labour is in too
weak a position to do much about its own circumstances. It is suggestive that,
while areas of rural Chhattisgarh are now the epicentre of the Maoist-inspired
Naxalite movement that is fighting a low-key guerrilla war against the state, I
never heard whisper of it trying to infiltrate the plant. Perhaps more revealing
is that, while I do not know of any significant work stoppage initiated by
contract workers in any part of the plant over the past 25 years, over that
period several plant-wide strikes have been threatened or called by contractors’
associations, who have brought their workers out in support of their own
demands. Combinations of contractors are more of an irritant to management
than combinations of contract workers.
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Security and ‘the size of the purse’
While in terms of security and ‘the size of the purse’, CPF workers are
privileged by comparison with most of the rest of the contract labour force, by
comparison with even the lowliest BSP worker they are poorly off. They are
paid at a daily rate – equal for men and women – that (with statutory
allowances) is double the state government minimum for unskilled labour. This
is less than one-third of what a newly appointed regular BSP worker on the
very bottom rung of the scale would be getting. By contrast with his prospects,
moreover, there are no promotions or increments to look forward to; and there
are none of the fringe benefits that in monetary terms would add around 50 per
cent to the value of his wage. These CPF rates are set with SAIL in Delhi at
the same time that the periodic pay revision for the regular workforce is
negotiated, and are inflation-proofed by linking them to six-monthly rises in
the All-India Consumer Price Index. Unlike un-unionized contract workers,
CPF workers can in my experience count on receiving their pay and have leave
entitlements that are mostly respected.5 Unlike other contract workers their
jobs are fairly secure. Though they are liable to lay-offs when the contract
comes to an end, when a new one is issued the contractor is obliged to re-
employ them. The principle is that, though the contractors may change, the
workforce does not – though it is periodically rotated between different parts
of the same shop-floor to provide a fig-leaf of protection against the claim that
they are fulfilling a permanent and perennial need.
As these workers have aged, some are no longer capable of the hard labour
required of them and it is an unofficial convention – which suits the
contractors who otherwise find it hard to get rid of them – that in such cases
a badli (a surrogate worker) from the same household should be taken on at the
same rate of pay. But that is noblesse oblige and it is equally the case that when
a contractor is determined to be rid of a troublesome CPF worker he can
manage it, and will do so with resolute management backing when CITU is
involved (as in most cases it is). As is the rule, it is politics rather than
indolence that gets one the sack, and it is BSP’s legal department, and not the
contractor, that will see the case through.
Rukhmani6 had worked in the plant from the age of 16, had joined INTUC and
was CPF rated. When her contractor refused the maternity benefits to which
she was entitled, and INTUC refused to help, she defected to CITU. Next time
her gate pass came up for revalidation (which happens every three months) it
was not renewed. CITU successfully went to court on her behalf, but the court’s
injunction was never implemented and she was not reinstated. After six years of
legal wrangling she threw in the towel by withdrawing her Provident Fund
benefits (thereby in effect resigning).
Along with 45 others, Tulsi was a CPF worker under a contractor in the
Blast Furnaces, though the latter then deployed them on rota in teams of six or
seven to a job he had bagging up naphthalene balls in the by-products plant of
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the Coke Ovens. In concentration, naphthalene is extremely noxious; the smell
was unbearable, their eyes continually stung, they came out in rashes and
suffered constant fatigue. The whole group protested that their gate passes were
made for the Blast Furnaces and that if any of them met with an accident in the
Coke Ovens they wouldn’t get compensation. When their contractor would not
listen they involved a firebrand CITU leader who took out a case demanding
that they should only be required to work in the department for which their
passes were valid, and for good measure that their jobs should be regularized.
Next time their passes were up for renewal, none of them were sanctioned.
Forty-three of the 46 then withdrew their case, renewed their membership of
INTUC and were eventually allowed to return to work. Tulsi and two others
held out and sanctioned CITU to pursue their case through the courts. Thirteen
years later, after three successive judgements in their favour in successively
higher level courts, and no sign that BSP would ever give way, their CITU
champion washed his hands of them. Tulsi and the other woman involved were
now anyway past retirement age, and recognized that, if they were at least to see
their Provident Fund entitlements before they died, they would have to give up.
Their younger male colleague struggles on.
A small proportion of the contract labour force is highly skilled and such
workers also generally earn well over the state government minimum rate. In
2010, a certified ‘G6’ specialist welder was getting around Rs 7,500 per month,
which is about half as much as the lowest-paid BSP employee, who is in all
likelihood completely unskilled. In 2006, the specialist refractory brick masons
who were rebuilding Coke Oven battery 3 were on a piece-work rate that
allowed them to earn up to Rs 400 a day, a monthly income on par with that of a
regular worker. There were about 60 of these masons, both Hindus and
Muslims but all from the same few districts of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar; many
had been employed in steel plants in Kuwait and Dubai as well as all over India.
They ran a tightly closed shop from which local masons were entirely excluded.
The (male) coolies and (female) rejas who were mixing cement and carrying
bricks for them were, however, all Chhattisgarhis and were respectively getting
a flat rate of Rs 60 and Rs 50 per day – that is, between one-seventh or eighth of
the bottom-of-the-rung BSP worker’s take-home pay. Those rates were then
typical for unskilled and un-unionized labour, and a differential of that order
has persisted throughout the time I have been visiting Bhilai. What that might
mean in human terms is best illustrated by a concrete example.
One of the Coke Oven jobs that has always been regarded as so tough that no
BSP worker should normally be expected to do it for more than four hours in a
shift is that of doorman on the batteries. Mummified against the scorching wall
of heat and the billowing acrid fumes from the open ovens and with only a slit
for his eyes, the doorman works on a narrow platform in front of the open ovens
cleaning up spillages and scraping burning cinders off the inside of the ten-
metre battery doors. In the event that the shift is shorthanded and he is asked to
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perform his duties throughout the eight hours, the BSP worker is given two ‘see
offs’ – an unofficial arrangement by which he is marked present on two
subsequent shifts when in fact he is not. By 2006, this job was now being
routinely done by HSCL labour. For the first four hours they were credited with
one hazri (attendance), for which they were then paid Rs 55–60, roughly one-
seventh of the rate that the BSP worker would have been getting for doing
exactly the same job, but without of course receiving any of the same allowances
and benefits, or any entitlement to holiday or sick pay. But actually the
contractors require these workers to do two hazris per shift – that is, to work the
full eight hours. Most of them had come from outlying villages and cycled an
hour or so each way to the plant. Some had another after-hours job. Dilip had
started work seven years earlier as a doorman at the age of 15 on a wage of Rs 50.
He was now getting an extra Rs 5, but for this had to stay on after the end of his
shift to carry sacks of refractory cement from battery 1 to 8 (about 800 metres).
Five days a week he would then go on to sell vegetables in different village
markets, spending in all about four hours a day on his bike. The other two days
he did tailoring in his village. His family were landless, but on that they got by
and he was managing to put his younger brother through high school. Several
others were doing two shifts back-to-back on the batteries. That is, they were
working continuously for 16 hours at a job that no BSP worker has ever been
required to do for more than four. For four times his maximum workload, they
stood to earn a little over half his salary.
The Indian economy has recently been growing at unprecedented rates and
I estimate that in terms of the purchasing power of their wages such workers
were perhaps 25 per cent better off in 2010 than they had been 15 years
earlier.7 That left them still desperately poor. In 2005, the poverty line was
drawn at households having an annual income of Rs 21,000. A household that
depended exclusively on the wage of the highest paid un-unionized BSP coolie
would, in the extremely unlikely event that he or she had been employed for
six days a week during every week of the year, have fallen just over 10 per cent
below that level; a household that depended on the wage of the lowest paid reja
would have fallen almost 50 per cent short of it. It is true that their wages may
be supplemented by some overtime and not infrequently by petty pilferage –
the wood, coal, wire and scrap metal that is smuggled out of the plant being in
my view more realistically seen as a hidden wage subsidy for the contractors
than as a ‘weapon of the weak’ self-consciously deployed against the dominant
classes (Scott, 1985). It is also true that the household may be supported by a
share in a marginal peasant holding and by more than one wage.
Unless they too have naukri, or unless their husbands are serious drunkards
(which is not uncommon), it is in general the case that the wives of BSP
workers do not take employment outside the home. They are not financially
constrained to do so nor is that respectable. For ‘labour class’ women there is
often no alternative. Apart from an appreciable proportion of female-headed
households, the wages of a single male breadwinner do not adequately feed an
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average-sized household of five. But, as we shall shortly see, rejas who must
work in the plant (as well as outside it) are vulnerable to sexual exploitation;
and it is their supposed sexual ‘availability’ that ‘proves’ to the labour
aristocracy that they themselves are a different and better breed.
On the calculation that a verifiable trail will solve the problem of under-
payment, BSP have recently tried to insist that all wages be directly
transmitted to a bank account in each worker’s name. The impact is too early
to judge, though it cannot have helped those with temporary passes who do not
appear on the system. In the case of those who do and are now paid in this way,
it is already clear that some contractors demand part reimbursement –
sometimes ostensibly to recover the costs they incur in bribes for renewing
their gate passes. Girdhari is nonetheless pleased. His daily rate had almost
doubled; and the Rs 200 his contractor levied monthly to cover ‘expenses’
seemed reasonable. Anita is less sanguine. She was paid through her bank for
just one month when her employer’s contract was being renegotiated.
While BSP workers reliably receive their salaries on the twelfth of the
month, insecurity really is the hallmark of the contract labourer’s condition. It
is not just low pay and job insecurity with which these workers must contend
but also insecurity about when – even whether – they will get their wages.
Some are not paid for weeks or months, and a few never are. While we are all
too familiar with industrial labour in India that is bonded by the acceptance of
an advance on wages (e.g. De Neve, 2005), in Bhilai it is ‘bonded’ by payment
in arrears. Workers cannot walk out because they cannot afford to forgo what
their contractor owes them, and the further behind he falls the more they are
bound. Often the problem starts at the top. Finance does not pass the main
contractor’s bills. His sub-contractors must wait, and so on down the line.
Everybody has liquidity problems and delays, and in the end it is the poorest
workers who must petition for more credit at the kirana dukhan (provision
store).
While BSP workers have a job for life and hardly ever move on, un-
unionized contract workers must expect to do so. Several of the rejas I
encountered in the Coke Ovens in 2006 were women I knew from construction
sites outside the plant and there is a steady flow of personnel between the two
kinds of workplace. Some had done spells as domestics (perhaps in the houses
of BSP workers) or as waste-pickers, and a few had been engaged in petty trade
or in the cottage-industry production of country cigarettes (bidis) and incense
sticks (agarbatti). For both men and women, work in construction is relatively
easy to get and it is usually possible to pick up two or three days casual
employment per week from the day labour chauri (market) that is located just
outside one of the BSP gates. Working from the chauri pays significantly better
than working in the plant, and it is broadly the case that wages outside are
marginally higher. Many, however, prefer a plant job because it is more regular
and more ‘restful work’ (aram ka kam).
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Work and work relationships
That judgement may seem surprising in the light of the work regime just
described for the HSCL Coke Oven doorman, and it is certainly the case that
the intensity of his labour is far greater than that of the overwhelming majority
of regular workers. When I first spent time on the BSP shop-floor in the mid-
1990s, their time keeping and labour discipline were rather relaxed (Parry,
1999a, 1999b). In ‘hard shops’ like the Coke Ovens, some jobs were extremely
tough and the physical conditions sometimes appalling. But workers worked
only in fairly short bursts, and those with the most taxing tasks were not
required to do more than four hours in a shift. Many with much softer duties
worked a great deal less, and once done would wander, drink tea, play pasa
(dice) or tash (cards), socialize with mates or read the newspaper. Some would
leave after a couple of hours; some would just appear to sign in at the start of
their shift and then go home; some would not come at all. Since manning levels
were then very generous, there was usually plenty of slack and workers
organized their own duty rosters and decided who would work when. When I
revisited the Coke Ovens in 2006 after major reductions in its permanent
workforce, I heard much grumbling about how exacting the regime had
become. But, while there had been important changes, these did not include
any marked intensification of hard physical labour, and the working day was
still punctuated by long periods of leisure.
The effort required of contract labour is generally greater, though the
variation is large. As a rule of thumb, those – like the Coke Oven doorman –
engaged in production-related tasks work at the highest intensity, and
management wisdom is that their security makes CPF workers less industrious
than the rest. Compared with work available outside the plant, however, much
of that done within it is quite ‘restful’.
When I first encountered them in the Coke Ovens in 1998, Sukhvaro and Santu
– a middle-aged couple – worked in a team of eight clearing coal-dust and
spillages from the tracks and conveyor belts. They are (Untouchable) Satnamis,
as was one other member of the group. The rest – who included a mother and
son, and the son’s ritual friend (mitan) – were of ‘Hindu’ caste (four of them
Oil-pressers and one a Washerman).8 All were Chhattisgarhis and CPF workers;
the majority were illiterate and none had attended school beyond the fourth
class. By then they had worked together for more than 10 years. Although they
would sit on the ground in convivial proximity to eat lunch, those of ‘Hindu’
caste would not accept food or water that the Satnamis had touched. When they
bought tea from the small canteen at the end of the shop, they would squat
outside and never sat at the tables that regular workers might occupy. The deal
with their contractor was that to make their CPF wage – at that time Rs 85 (with
the allowances Rs 115) – they had to load and unload five truckloads in the day,
each of which took about an hour to fill. They’d complete one before a tea break
at 10:00 am, then another couple before lunch, and the rest of their quota in the
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afternoon. There was no incentive to do more, and if there was material easily to
hand (as there generally was on some of the sites between which they were
rotated) they could be through by 2:30 or 3:00 pm. They never worked later
than 4:00 pm. If one was away sick, they would still make five trips and split the
absent worker’s wage between them. If two were off, they would be replaced by
a couple of temporary contract workers on a daily rate of Rs 27 and the
contractor would save. He had a couple of regular supervisors to oversee his
labour, which was working in two separate departments, but they were seldom
present – unlike the two BSP workers that were delegated to oversee the job.
Dinesh, an activist in the (virulently right-wing) Shiv Sena – though a
surprisingly mild-mannered fellow – would sit somewhere near in the shade on
an upturned can staring vacantly into space. When I asked if he wasn’t bored he
would say that it was far better than the job he would otherwise have on the
oven tops. Gupta doubled as a sign-painter and was less well liked. He reputedly
had an eye for young rejas and would behave like ‘a bigger Sahib than the Sahib’
(the BSP officer who managed the contract). Both whiled away time chatting to
Ayodhya, the truck-driver, who was employed by a separate transport contractor
and whose only duty was to make five trips of about half a mile per day.
Though it ended badly, when I first met them Nitu (a Kurmi or ‘farmer’ by
caste) and Gopi (an Adivasi ‘Tribal’) were labourers on the construction site for
a large municipal stadium and romantically involved. A year later, both were
working in the plant and finding it easygoing by comparison. Nitu’s job was
cleaning floors and machinery in the Rail Mill. She just had to sweep the refuse
into piles and some lads would carry it away. (Outside the plant, carrying is
women’s work.) She was left largely unsupervised and never put in more than
four hours a day. ‘My job is very restful’, she told me. ‘In the plant you can look
after your body, and you don’t have to work in the sun or the rain. Compared
with before, I look good now, don’t I Sir?’ The demands on Gopi were no more
exacting, and though the stadium had paid more it was nothing like an
equivalent for the extra labour required of him. But what struck him most was
that nobody swore at him here and that all that bothered his supervisors was
safety. When he sustained a small cut to his finger he was immediately sent to
the first-aid post to get it bandaged. In the previous job he could have cut off his
hand and nobody would have noticed.
Shortly before our conversation, Kamlesh had been working in the plant as
‘helper’ to a fitter for Rs 45 per day, but his gate pass had expired and he was
now employed on a construction site outside for Rs 50. He was desperate to
return to the plant, even if there he earned less. ‘It is aram ka kam,’ he
explained. ‘I only had to get out the spanner and screwdriver and just sit. Here
the work does not ‘‘nourish’’ (he meant ‘‘suit’’) me.’
Mostly, plant jobs are ‘restful’ because nobody in authority has an interest in
requiring more, but sometimes effort is withheld by the contract labourer on
the bloody-minded calculation that ‘if the BSP worker works, I’ll work.
He’s a 500-rupee-per-day-vala, and if he doesn’t work why should we 40 or
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50 rupee-valas do so?’ When I asked contract labourers whether BSP workers
were not uneasy about that disparity, I was liable to be told that ‘those people
have no shame’.
Dinesh, on his upturned can, shows no sign of it. To the contrary, he often
complains of his heavy responsibilities. Though supervisors ‘cause work to be
done’ (kam karvana), typically from a sitting position, as he understands it his
main function is less to extract unremitting effort from gang members than to
ensure that they do not get run down by the pusher car. Indeed, his official job
designation is suraksha mukhya (safety headman). Though things were much
worse in the past, the plant remains a seriously dangerous working
environment. Almost every year there are deaths (in 1997 there were nine)
and most victims are contract workers. That is not surprising given the lethal
conditions in which some of them toil – on the 2006 rebuilding of battery 3,
lines of rejas carrying head-loads of bricks over narrow strips of corrugated
iron supported only at alarmingly wide intervals by bamboo scaffolding, with a
40-foot drop to the ground below and with the hook of an overhead crane
hovering menacingly over their heads; a couple of gas-cutters without safety-
harnesses sitting equally high on a two-foot diameter pipe through which they
had cut to within a few millimetres. Senior management is acutely aware of the
issue. Registered contract workers are given a day’s safety training (though
contractors routinely render this irrelevant by dispatching them to a different
shop), and there are periodic safety awareness campaigns. It was probably
Gupta who painted the new billboard near the entrance to the shop that (in
English) reminded workers who could read it: ‘Safety at Work/Safe Tea at
Home’. And shop-floor managers are also aware that in the event of an
accident they are ultimately responsible and that in recent cases colleagues have
been led off in handcuffs.
That is what Dinesh and many other regular workers are supposedly doing –
preventing accidents. More are needed to oversee the technical aspects of tasks
that contract labour performs. The trend has an important bearing on the
growing differentiation that sets different fractions of labour apart. BSP
workers are increasingly becoming a supervisory staff. For my friends in the
Coke Oven Heating Group, the increased use of contract labour has
significantly reduced the physical demands of the job but has added – at least
as they represent it – to the ‘responsibility’ (jawabdari) they shoulder and the
‘tension’ (they use the English word) they experience. To the outside observer,
however, what is more striking is the seemingly redundant multiplication of
supervisory functions. I was one day down in the cellar under battery 4 where
four members of the group were overseeing a cleaning job being done by five
contract workers. When two of them came to check on the measurement
between the walls of the ovens when battery 3 was being re-built, they were
simply repeating what the masons themselves, the Refractory Group, the
contractor’s engineer and the BSP officer in charge of the project had done.
When I asked one of their colleagues what the need was, he irreverently
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suggested that it was ‘just to perform a ‘‘role’’ (sirf role marne ke liye)’ and to
spot the talent among the young rejas working there.
Even for those workers not directly affected by this shift towards super-
visory tasks, contract labour certainly alters the character of manual labour and
mitigates its unpleasantness. It is not new technology that makes it less arduous
and filthy than it used to be, but the fact that the worst tasks are hived off to
others. BSP workers are in significant measure liberated from the most
dangerous and laborious parts of the job. The virtual moratorium on new
recruitment to permanent posts over the past 15 years has reinforced the trend.
The workforce is ageing. By 2006 more than half of the workers in the two
Coke Oven work groups I know best were already aged 45 or over. Many are no
longer physically capable of the toughest tasks; even if they are, the quasi-
automatic cluster system of promotion means that they regard themselves as
too senior to be asked to perform them. Contract labour would now be
extremely difficult to eliminate and regular workers would have a much harder
life if that happened.
The Coke Ovens is a shop in which ‘real men’ work, and its permanent
workforce is exclusively male. In terms of regional ethnicity, caste and religion,
however, it is remarkably heterogeneous. Though the proportion of local
Chhattisgarhis has grown significantly since the early days of the plant,
workers of outsider ancestry are still massively over-represented in relation to
their share of the population. More or less every work group is likely to contain
a mix of ‘locals’ and ‘outsiders’ from all corners of India, of workers from a
whole range of castes and very likely also representatives of different religious
communities. Facility in English differentiates highly credentialized managers
who are mostly at a fairly senior level from the majority of junior managers and
nearly all workers. The lingua franca of the plant is standard Hindi, and – as a
badge of ‘civilization’ – even among themselves Chhattisgarhi BSP workers
speak Hindi. It is only when issuing orders to contract labour that they switch
to Chhattisgarhi.
These BSP work groups are highly stable over time, develop strong bonds of
solidarity and commonly engage in after-hours socializing (Parry, 1999a,
1999b). Nearly all their members live in the township or elsewhere in the
urban area, and – though a few now own cars – arrive at work on their motor-
bikes. At the start of their shift they all shake hands – with managers as well
when they are present. During it they sit together to eat and – regardless of
caste – share preparations brought from home. It is impossible to refuse,
especially if one is a Brahman and an Untouchable colleague proffers the
delicacy. Members of the work group are hardly ever kin, do not establish
fictive kinship relations with each other and very rarely use kin terms to
address or refer to each other. Even elders are almost invariably known and
called by personal names (Ramlal or Ramayan, perhaps suffixed by ‘ji’ for
respect) or by their ‘surname’ (which is often a caste title like Verma and
Sahu). They think of themselves as colleagues, not quasi-relatives. Within and
between work groups there is a good deal of banter and joking. Much of this
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revolves around the incompetence and corruption of management, and the
alleged slackness of other work groups. More of it plays on the stereotypical
characteristics of different regional ethnicities and neatly fits the classic
anthropological theory of joking relationships as arising in situations of
‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’, of enforced amity underlain by hostility
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, ch. 4).
In almost every respect, the groups in which contract workers work are
generally different. They are likely to be made up of workers of both sexes, but
the large majority of sanghvari man (workmates in dialect) are Chhattisgarhis
and speak Chhattisgarhi together. A good many live in villages in the
surrounding countryside and all walk or cycle to work. They must enter the
plant through different gates from regular workers, and there is no round of
handshakes when they arrive on the shop floor. No contract worker would hold
out his hand to the BSP worker with whom he will spend the next shift.
Within the plant, most observe the rules of commensality that apply outside it.
The ‘Hindu’ castes accept food and water from each other, but not from
Satnamis. Not only do they share the same ethnicity, but some gang members
may be kin. In the BSP manual mines at Dalli-Rajhara, kinship links between
members of the gangs that raise ore are even more prevalent. This is because
they have been allowed a good deal of latitude to form their own groups, the
piece-rate system in such back-breaking work makes it especially undesirable
to carry shirkers (particularly if one is not related to them) and it is unwise to
risk working with a witch (tonhi), the dangers of witchcraft being a major
preoccupation in rural Chhattisgarh.
In the absence of real kinship links, however, contract labour gangs in both
the plant and the mines create ties of fictive kinship between their members
and kin terms are the usual mode of address. I have outlined elsewhere the way
in which informal-sector workers characteristically decide on the kind of
kinship relationship they will have and the kind of strategizing that often
prompts their choice.
Kashi…classifies Kamla as his nani (maternal grandmother) because Kamla is
the name of his real grandmother. Phirantin is his bhabhi (eBW [elder brother’s
wife]) because she comes from the same village as the wife of one of his
classificatory brothers. Other links might easily have been traced and his choice
of terms is motivated. Both of these relationships permit joking, and with one’s
bhabhi in particular the joking is expected to take an explicitly sexual form and
may even extend to horseplay. Kashi is fancy free, Phirantin is pretty, the
outcome predictable. And if Phirantin is married, her husband’s sense of humour
is put to the test – which is why most couples avoid work on the same site.
(Parry, 2001, p. 807)
Since one thing leads to another, Lalita’s sense of propriety has made her
absolutely forbid any of her sanghvari (co-workers) to call her bhauji (the dialect
form of bhabhi).
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As this suggests, the joking among groups of contract workers largely revolves
around sex and marriage, and I infer that it expresses unease about the very
real possibility of inter-caste unions. I was sitting one day outside the canteen
they frequent having tea with the Sukhvaro-Santu group when one of the
young men in their gang jumped to his feet and ran in. A minute or so later he
emerged dragging a laughingly protesting young reja by the wrist. ‘Look,
Sahib, look! This is my wife!’ The joke was that she was called Janki, the name
of his mama-dai (mother’s mother in Chhattisgarhi), with whom that kind of
license can be taken. A couple of days later, we were in the same place when a
portly BSP worker sauntered by. ‘There goes your samdhi [your co-parent-in-
law]’, said one of the group to Bisahin. She had a 5-year-old son, the BSP
worker had a girl of the same age and the joke was that they would marry them
off. Often the humour lies in the word play. Damini begs for chuna (lime) to
mix with the tobacco that many coolies and rejas addictively chew. She is young
and good looking so Raju pretends to hear chuma (a kiss). Rajeshvari reports
that she recently met her old malik (owner), the contractor who had formerly
employed her, but the group chooses to understand her to mean her first
husband (bihata), provoking ribald remarks about how the bihata is always
more sexually exciting than subsequent men a woman might ‘make’.
Much contract labour involves gruelling and unpleasant work, and much of
it is remunerated at highly exploitative rates, but – as Shah (2006) brings out
for the ‘Tribal’ labour that migrates from rural Jharkhand to the brick-kilns of
Bihar and Bengal – this should not obscure the fact that the workplace may
also represent a zone of freedom from normal restraints and may provide
opportunities for fun or even romance. Many young people in Bhilai see a job
in the plant or on a construction site as providing the promise of sexual
adventure, and affairs are common. Many involve couples of much the same
age and social standing, but – by contrast with Shah’s rather benign picture –
many others are of a more unsettling sort. Young rejas are susceptible to sexual
as well as economic exploitation.
Good-looking ones are liable to be assigned by their contractor to the offices
of the BSP managers who matter to him, where they have rather light duties
sweeping up and fetching water. It is, however, widely supposed that other
services are demanded of them.
In July 1997, the naked corpse of a reja called Bijhvarin Bai was found in the
undergrowth near the Water Supply Department where she had been employed
in the General Manager’s office. She had been raped, choked and bludgeoned
to death.9 Two BSP workers were arrested. One supposedly confessed to being
her lover and to her murder; the other had allegedly helped dispose of the body.
Neither was ever brought to trial; and CITU and the press claimed that the
evidence had been fabricated, and that there was a cover-up to protect
senior BSP officers who were regularly requiring the sexual services of rejas.
Once it had been released for cremation by the authorities, a CITU rally
brought the corpse to the main administrative building of the plant where they
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demonstrated all afternoon before moving on to the main township police
station. It emerged that in the weeks before her murder, the plant had been
purging CITU members; that Bijhvarin was among the 21 CPF and non-CPF
workers to be terminated by her contractor, and that of the latter she was – for
unexplained reasons – the only one to be reinstated. What also became clear in
the aftermath was that her murder was being used as a pretext for laying off
more CITU labour. The Contractors’ Association wrung it hands in anguish,
but how could its members go on employing women in the plant when they
were so unsafe? Needless to say, those judged most ‘unsafe’ were CITU
supporters.
On the shop-floor, rejas are supervised by BSP workers who have the position
and pay-packet to impress, and some latitude to assign them the best or worst
tasks and overtime, and to control the length of their working day.
Unsurprisingly, many shop-floor sexual liaisons go with the ‘hypergamous
grain’. They cross, that is, what I claim is the class divide between the two
types of workers, and at the same time reinforce it by demonstrating that
‘labour class’ women are fair game. While the latter are almost invariably
Chhattisgarhis, their paramours are probably outsiders by origin.
Such relations apart, BSP workers and contract labourers seldom fraternize
and never sit together to eat. This is emphatically a matter of class and not
caste distinction. The reluctance is on both sides. Regardless of caste, BSP
workers eat with others in their work group; regardless of caste, none of them
eats with contract labour. When I asked Suresh, an HSCL worker, why he was
going off separately for lunch rather than sit with the Heating Group workers
he had just been assisting, I was told that ‘it is not good to eat with big people’.
‘But aren’t they your own age?’ I objected. ‘Yes’, he confirmed, ‘but they are
‘‘permanent-vale’’’. When I was first in the Coke Ovens, the inflexible rule was
that after a tea break everybody in the BSP work group would wash their own
glass, even their officer if he had joined them. Nobody was expected to handle
the saliva-polluted utensils of any anybody else. By the time I returned to the
shop-floor in 2006 it was usual to get contract workers to make the tea and
wash the glasses, as well perform other personal services, regular workers of
Untouchable caste no less than others unselfconsciously barking peremptory
orders at contract labourers who were often their caste superiors.
Concluding summary
My aim in this paper has been to provide a descriptive analysis of the way in
which the working world of contract labourers in a public-sector Indian steel
plant is differentiated from that of its regular workforce. The two kinds of
workers regard themselves as distinct kinds of people and are now best seen as
distinct social classes. While the sociology of India has broadly accepted the
manual/non-manual labour distinction as the crucial marker of the boundary
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between the working and the middle classes, I have suggested that that between
naukri (secure employment) and kam (insecure wage labour) – which cuts right
across that distinction – is a more important marker of difference. Naukri is
what the regular workforce has; kam is what contract workers do. This emic
distinction is broadly congruent with that between the organized (formal) and
the unorganized (informal) sectors and is a product of state policies and
legislation. On one side are the minority of workers whose jobs and conditions
of work are protected by labour law; on the other the large unprotected
majority.
The Nehruvian planners supposed that organized-sector workers would
provide a beacon in terms of pay and conditions for the industrial working
class as a whole. Instead they became a privileged aristocracy of labour
cocooned from the rest. Though early on BSP employment provided
opportunities for significant upward mobility and it was not uncommon for
informal sector workers to move into secure regular jobs, those opportunities
have been progressively curtailed. The distinction between the two kinds of
worker has hardened. On the other hand, the ‘closed box’ image of
employment at the bottom of the labour hierarchy, which sees the labouring
poor desperately protecting their own small niche against interlopers, does not
ring true in this context. There are, rather, a set of bottom-of-the-heap
occupations – ranging from contract and construction labour to waste-picking
and vegetable-selling – between which mobility is ‘readily possible and
typically observable’. Those who do them constitute a ‘social class’ as Weber
defined it.
The liberalization of the Indian economy has in some ways widened the gap.
Over the past 25 years the regular workforce has been reduced by half and their
labour replaced by that of much cheaper contract workers. But, perhaps
unexpectedly, this shift does not appear to have exerted downward pressure on
the wages of regular workers. What it has meant is that increasing numbers of
them are assigned to supervisory duties and – liberated from the grimiest and
most gruelling tasks – manual labour now has a very different meaning even for
those who are not. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that their rather
generous wages and benefits, their rather relaxed work regime and the
company’s impressive profits are sustained only by cheap contract labour.
Regular workers are at least in part privileged because contract workers are
treated so shabbily. Their interests are by no means the same.
Though it certainly existed before, economic liberalization has also
heightened the tension between market imperatives and the labour laws.
While the law appears to require that workers who do routinely necessary jobs
should have regular employment contracts, BSP has consistently circumvented
it and increasingly employed contract labour in operational tasks. What the
state has given with one hand, state industry has taken away with the other.
What has above all enabled it to do so is that management has always been able
to ensure that it had to deal only with a ‘pocket’ union and has consistently
fired supporters of a rival one that was prepared to fight the corner of contract
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labour. To avoid taking many on as permanent workers, and with the
complicity of the recognized union, it had nonetheless to acquiesce in the
creation of a new category of relatively secure and well-remunerated CPF
workers. The effect was a differentiation within the contract labour force itself.
This CPF labour is paid at a rate that is only a fraction of what any regular
BSP worker will get, though it is a considerably larger fraction than the general
run of contract workers receive. Contractors are easily able to avoid paying the
legal minimum rate, and, with families to support, the wages of contract
workers are well below poverty line levels. Not only is their employment
chronically insecure but they frequently have to contend with late payment
(leading to a kind of labour bondage) or even default. Because of their
miserable pay, both husbands and wives are forced to work, but at work the
latter are subject to the sexual predation of regular employees, their
susceptibility to it reinforcing the belief that ‘labour class’ people are quite
distinct in culture and morals. The composition of the work groups to which
two kinds of labour characteristically belong is sharply differentiated by
gender, by regional ethnicity and by urban or rural residence. Interactions
within the work group are again very different, while interactions between
regular and contract workers are largely confined to the work itself. Outside it
they are kept to a minimum, testifying to a shared sense that socially the two
kinds of workforce are profoundly different.
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Notes
1 Originally designed to produce one million tonnes of steel, by the beginning of 2011
BSP’s output had reached 5.8 million tonnes and was being expanded to seven million
at present levels of manning.
2 Sintering is a process of agglomerating fine particles of iron ore by combustion into
lumps for the Blast Furnaces.
3 Hitvada, 3 February 2011.
4 For a detailed account of the union scene in Bhilai, see Parry (2009).
5 They are also eligible for free treatment in the company hospital, but, by contrast
with regular workers, this does not extend to other members of their households or to
diagnosis and treatment outside the BSP system. This differentiation is intended to
maintain clear water between the two workforces.
6 I employ pseudonyms throughout.
7 This estimate is based mainly on consumer price information published by the
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI), and I have averaged
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the figures for coolies and rejas. Retrieved from http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/
upload/arep9900ch5.htm.
8 On the Satnami/‘Hindu’ caste distinction, see Parry (1999b).
9 Much of what I know about this case is gleaned from the local press – in particular
from extensive coverage in Dainik Bhaskar for July and August, 1997.
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